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ABSTRACT 
Applying a partial equilibrium model of the electricity market we analyse effects of exposing 
household electricity customers to retail products with variable pricing. Both short-term and 
long-term effects of exposing customers to hourly spot market prices and a simpler rebate 
scheme are analysed under scenarios with large shares of wind power in a Danish case study. 
Our results indicate strategies that could be favourable in ensuring high adoption of products 
and efficient response by households. We find that simple pricing schemes, though 
economically less efficient, could become important in an early phase to initialise the 
development of household demand response. At a later point, when long-term dynamics take 
effect, a larger effort should be made to shift consumers onto real-time rates, and an increased 
focus on overall adoption of variable pricing will be required. Another finding is that demand 
response under variable pricing makes wind power more valuable. These gains in value 
reduce the need for support, and could be redistributed in further support of demand response. 
KEYWORDS 
Dynamic electricity prices, load-shift rebate, demand response, household consumers, partial 
equilibrium model, wind power. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Incentives for household electricity consumers to provide flexibility are increasingly being 
discussed to support the integration of intermittent renewable energies [1]. To do so, 
incentives need to be highly dynamic, and real-time pricing is frequently mentioned as 
providing highest economic benefits. Households may perceive dynamic pricing as complex 
and as potentially colliding with their preference for stability, predictability and low risk [2,3]. 
Because individual behaviour shapes household consumption [4], it will barely be planned 
ahead of time and will most often not be automated or remote controlled. Demand response in 
this segment may therefore face a dilemma in that the economically most efficient pricing 
schemes will be too complex for the majority of customers to become interested in or react 
upon. If schemes are simplified, on the other hand, they will generate far less economic 
benefits, especially in systems with large shares of renewable generation. In this paper we 
contribute to evaluating this trade-off between economic efficiency and product simplicity by 
determining the effect of a simple rebate scheme as compared to dynamic hourly pricing.  
 
While our analysis builds on general economic principles, we derive results in a stylised 
Danish setting, to illustrate the interplay of demand response with large-scale development of 
intermittent production. With Danish energy policy aiming at a fossil-free electricity supply in 
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2035 [5], wind energy is going to play a major role in the future [6]. In 2020 electricity 
generation from wind energy should make up close to 50% of annual consumption [7]. The 
increasing volumes of wind power require sufficient flexible capacity to maintain a stable 
system, and with conventional power plants replaced by renewable generators, the Danish 
electricity system operator, amongst several other initiatives, aims at a better utilisation of 
demand-side flexibility [8]; though this still is subject to removing various barriers within the 
regulatory framework [9].  
 
We focus on household consumption, because in this segment we expect the trade-off 
between efficiency and effectiveness of incentives to be most significant. It has been 
established that household consumers hold a technical potential to provide flexibility [10]. 
Several studies show that, when provided with economic incentives, they will utilise their 
potential and thus reveal some extent of elasticity towards short-term electricity prices (see 
Faruqui and Sergici [11] for an overview). For competitive retail markets it should be 
acknowledged, though, that consumers cannot be forced into specific schemes. They rather 
choose their pricing plans themselves and determine which products for demand response are 
going to be adopted.  
 
Possible products have been discussed thoroughly [12] and may be categorised into price-
based and volume-based schemes, depending on whether customers receive varying prices or 
are subject to direct constraints on their level of consumption [13]. Demand response of 
households without the use of automation will typically have to occur under price-based 
schemes. Here we can distinguish three major types of rate designs [14]: 1) time-of-use 
pricing, 2) critical event pricing, 3) real-time pricing. The first type consists of a mostly static 
pattern of prices that make it less efficient in a system based on wind power like the Danish 
one. The latter two are more dynamic schemes. In critical event pricing customers are subject 
to a significant price increase or rebate at specific times considered critical. With real-time 
pricing customers receive frequently updated price signals reflecting system cost. While all of 
these schemes provide an incentive for demand response, they differ in their theoretical 
economic potential and in how effective they will be in practice. 
 
Real-time pricing is the ideal scheme from an economic point of view [15] and should be well 
suited in a dynamic environment with large fluctuations from wind power. Recent experience 
shows, however, that real-time prices work best with automated control and may be less 
applicable to manual response [16,17]. Comparisons of dynamic pricing studies also reveal 
that higher elasticities are achieved under critical event pricing or time-of-use schemes than 
under real-time pricing [18]. Schemes with higher economic potential tend to be more 
complex from a customer point of view [19] resulting in higher transaction costs [20], which 
in turn may reduce effectiveness by lowering adoption and response potential. Figure 1 is an 
attempt to illustrate this trade-off by putting different types of pricing schemes into the two 
mentioned dimensions. So although real-time pricing in theory should be the best solution, it 
might not be in practice, when taking into account behavioural aspects of households like: 
response fatigue [21], risk aversion [22] and resistance to increasing transaction cost [23]. 
 
In this paper we evaluate the economic benefits of an electricity retail product for demand 
response that is less complex than real-time pricing. We therefore compare economic gains of 
switching customers from a flat rate to hourly pricing to those of switching customers to a 
rebate product that customers should be better able to foresee the implications of. For that 
purpose we set up a partial equilibrium model of the electricity market based on hourly values 
(Section 2) and derive results for two different scenarios of wind production in a Danish 
3 
 
setting (Section 3 presents the underlying case study assumptions). We then compare 
outcomes for the different retail price regimes (Sections 4 and 5).  
 
As we will show in the following brief review of related work, elements of our study have 
been addressed in the literature previously. Economic analyses of demand response have been 
conducted in various studies and within different market and regulatory contexts (for an 
overview see Conchado and Linares [18]). Where we identify a gap and contribute with this 
paper is in economic benefit analyses of different retail pricing schemes including long-term 
dynamics in a setting with intermittent renewables. Based on such analyses we will be better 
able to evaluate the gap in economic benefit that we might have to accept in order to achieve 
effective incentives in terms of adoption and response levels.  
 
A number of studies conduct their analysis in a static setting assuming the response has no 
impact on prices. Many of these works consider real-time or hourly pricing: e.g. analysing 
heating and cooling in Texas [24], household appliances in Ireland [25] and Germany [26,27] 
or storage-like loads under German [28] and Danish [29] conditions. Static prices simplify the 
analysis of different retail pricing structures, which might be the reason that besides real-time 
pricing also many analyses of simpler rate structures have been performed. Some of them 
study critical event pricing [30,31], but most works look into the effects of time-of-use rates 
from the perspective of utilities [32–34] or customers [35,36].   
 
We choose an approach based on economic equilibrium modelling in order to account for the 
dynamic market impacts of demand response. After all the impact on prices and generation 
capacities has been one of the main arguments in favour of demand response. Even though 
many studies use a similar equilibrium approach, they do not necessarily take long-term 
dynamics into account. Such works acknowledge the price impact of the response, but keep 
supply capacities static. Analyses with a short-term focus have been carried out examining 
real-time or day-ahead pricing (e.g. in the US [37–39], the UK [40,41], Slovenia [42] or 
Denmark [43]), time-of-use and critical peak pricing [44,45] as well as incentive-based 
response schemes [46,47]. A short-term equilibrium approach provides a bit more insight into 
the market dynamics of demand response. To fully evaluate the impact of policies, however, 
the short-term approach should be accompanied by an analysis of the long-term equilibrium 
[48]. One particular formal equilibrium framework developed for demand response by 
Borenstein and Holland [49] has been applied several times in different variations, showing 
how real-time pricing and resulting response of elastic demand generates significant benefits 
even with limited elasticities, for example, for US electricity markets [50,51] and Norway 
[52]. A related approach has been developed and applied to four weeks of Danish wind and 
demand data [53]. 
 
Long-term models result in the construction of an electricity system with optimal generation 
capacities. Usually this neglects existing capacity in a market, assuming divestment from 
overcapacity. As long as the state of the system is not taken into account, the long-term 
equilibrium found remains somewhat theoretical. Energy system models take a step further. 
They require a high level of detail in representing the energy system often resulting in 
extensive computation requirements. Analyses have been carried out, for example, with a 
focus on demand response from residential appliances [54–56], heat pumps [57–59] or 
electric vehicles [60–62].  
 
Besides one analysis quantifying the impact of time-of-use pricing [50], the above long-term 
equilibrium studies do not take into account retail products that are less complex than hourly 
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pricing. While hourly pricing may be the efficient and a realistic option, one has to take into 
account the restrictions of individual consumers in reacting to hourly prices and their potential 
reluctance in adopting such schemes [63]. The impact of rebate pricing or other critical event 
pricing has only been analysed in short-term modelling frameworks [44,45] or estimated on 
the basis of empirical data [64,65]. 
 
Increasingly renewable energies have become an argument in favour of demand response and 
benefits are expected to become even more distinct. The economic impacts of large shares of 
renewables have been studied in equilibrium settings, without including demand response 
(e.g. for Southern [66,67] and Central European markets [68,69]). Some studies take into 
account demand response and renewables but limit analysis to a local grid [70], apply a static 
market setting [71–73], or derive short-term equilibria [39–41]. The long-term interaction of 
renewable energies with demand flexibility is most thoroughly analysed in the energy system 
studies mentioned above. These studies however assume optimal response to real-time system 
prices and do not consider specific retail product structures. This is where we set in with this 
paper. 
2. METHOD 
2.1 Market model 
The model developed is a closed-market model without interconnections to other systems. To 
find a short-term equilibrium requires a specification of demand and supply curves based on 
the characteristics of generators and consumers and their respective marginal cost and benefit 
functions.  
 
The demand side is characterised by a price elasticity of demand that may be defined in 
several ways depending on the underlying model of individual utility [74]. Moreover one has 
to distinguish between elasticity of demand due to price changes of the good itself (own-price 
elasticity) and of other goods (cross-price elasticity). Here we focus on own-price elasticity. 
We use constant elasticities defined as the percentage change of quantity Q given a 
percentage change of the price P [75]: 
 
𝜀 = 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑
 𝑑
𝑑
 (1) 
 
Our focus lies on the short-term elasticity of electricity demand, which is expressed in 
adjustments along a demand curve that is static within the analysed time horizon. Sometimes 
this is referred to as the real-time price elasticity [76]. We do not consider structural changes 
in electricity demand due to investments in appliances on the basis of the long-term price 
level [77]. Moreover, potential effects from changes in income are not included [78]. This is a 
simplification we consider acceptable, as individual changes in income based on savings from 
variable pricing will be relatively small. 
 
Our constant-elasticity demand curves have the form: 
 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝐷0,𝑡 �𝑑𝑡𝑑0�𝜀 (2) 
 
With  
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Dt: Demand in hour t 
D0,t: Baseline demand in hour t 
Pt: Price in hour t 
P0: Anchor price 
ε: Price elasticity 
 
The model requires a baseline demand D0,t and an anchor price P0 as a starting point for any 
response. While P0 is a fixed anchor price, D0,t changes on an hourly basis. P0 is set such that 
it reflects the efficient level of the flat-rate tariff in the reference case.  
 
The marginal benefit function is derived from the demand function incorporating both the 
demand from consumers on a flat-rate tariff and consumers on a variable tariff such that: 
 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝐷0,𝑡 �𝛼 �𝑑𝑡𝑑0�𝜀 + (1 − α) �𝑑𝑓𝑑0�𝜀� (3) 
 
With additional parameters: 
 
α: Share of consumers on variable prices 
Pf: Flat-rate price 
 
Rearranging for the price Pt to find the inverse demand function [79], provides us with the 
aggregate marginal benefit function:  
 
𝑀𝑀𝑡 = 𝑑0 �1𝛼 � 𝐷𝑡𝐷0,𝑡 − (1 − α) �𝑑𝑓𝑑0�𝜀��
1
𝜀
 (4) 
 
Here we have to ensure that Dt > D0,t (1 – α) (Pf  / P0)ε, i.e. total demand will never be less 
than the demand of flat-rate customers. 
 
With a flat rate Pf equal to P0 and a 100% share of flat-rate customers the model simply yields 
the load curve D0,t. If a share of customers is exposed to spot prices, total demand follows the 
curve described by equations (3) and (4). For increased elasticity ε and increased share of 
customers on variable prices α market demand becomes more elastic. For a given price 
elasticity ε, Figure 2 illustrates the shape of the demand curves at different adoption levels of 
the variable pricing scheme.  
 
To model generation we use a step-wise supply curve. Supply is based on wind power and 
three generic thermal technologies: base load, mid-merit and peak load capacity. The short-
term marginal cost function is a piecewise linear function as illustrated in Figure 3 and 
described by: 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑡 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 for  𝐷𝑡 ≤ 𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑡
𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣,𝑏𝑣𝑏𝑏 for  𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑡 < 𝐷𝑡 ≤ 𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑡 + 𝐾𝑏𝑣𝑏𝑏
𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣,𝑚𝑤𝑤 for  𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑡 + 𝐾𝑏𝑣𝑏𝑏 < 𝐷𝑡 ≤ 𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑡 + 𝐾𝑏𝑣𝑏𝑏 + 𝐾𝑚𝑤𝑤
𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣,𝑝𝑏𝑣𝑝 for  𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑡 + 𝐾𝑏𝑣𝑏𝑏 + 𝐾𝑚𝑤𝑤 < 𝐷𝑡 ≤ 𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤,𝑡 + 𝐾𝑏𝑣𝑏𝑏 + 𝐾𝑚𝑤𝑤 + 𝐾𝑝𝑏𝑣𝑝 (5) 
 
With 
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Qwind,t: Quantity supplied by wind in hour t 
Kbase/mid/peak: Installed capacities of respective technology 
cvar,base/mid/peak: Variable costs of respective technology 
 
A computational difficulty occurs at the shift of one technology to the next, as well as when 
demand exceeds supply capacity. We therefore insert steep slopes at these positions of the 
supply curve to avoid vertical curve sections. These enable us to determine equilibrium prices 
at any point and ensure market clearing in every case. Most importantly, we may approximate 
finite price spikes without having to set a price cap. The sloping sections are defined such 
that: 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑡 = 𝑐𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑤𝑤,𝑡 + 𝑘�𝐷𝑡 − 𝑑𝑏𝑠𝑚,𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑣𝑣,𝑡�         for  𝐾𝑏𝑠𝑚,𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑣𝑣 < 𝐷𝑡 < 𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣,𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑤𝑤𝑘  (6) 
 
With 
 
cmargin,t: Variable costs of the marginal technology in hour t 
𝑑𝑏𝑠𝑚,𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑣𝑣,𝑡: Sum of inframarginal production incl. wind in hour t 
𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣,𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑣: Variable costs of next extramarginal technology 
k: Emergency slope 
 
In theory the factor k, representing the slope between steps, has an infinite value. Using a 
sufficiently large number will result in practically vertical slopes. We can interpret the minor 
additional capacity as emergency generation only utilised during short periods of time [80]. 
We use a constant value for k of 106. 
2.2 Determining equilibrium 
The above supply and demand curves enable us to calculate a short-term equilibrium by 
setting marginal cost equal to marginal benefits in every time step. We derive a set of hourly 
prices that, in combination with the respective technologies’ cost structures, determines 
generator revenues. Profits are then determined as: 
 
Π𝑚𝑏𝑤 = ��𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 �𝑑𝑡 − 𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣,𝑔𝑔𝑔�� − 𝐾𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑓,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑇
𝑡=1  (7) 
 
With 
 
Qgen,t: Quantity supplied by generation technology  in hour t 
Kgen: Installed capacity of generation technology 
cvar,gen: Variable cost of generation technology 
cfix,gen: Fixed cost of generation technology 
 
In the long run generators have the possibility to adjust their capacities. New entrants may 
join the market, or plants may be shut down. This process continues until capacity reaches a 
new long-term equilibrium, where adding additional capacity would result in overall losses, 
while reducing capacity would result in profits attracting new entrants and a capacity increase. 
 
Retailers will have to buy volumes supplied to their customers at the equilibrium wholesale 
prices. The retail market will reach equilibrium, when retailer profits become zero. 
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Eventually, consumers will therefore pay a price exactly covering whole-sale procurement 
costs of their suppliers, and retailer profits would be determined as: 
 
Π𝑣𝑏𝑡𝑣𝑤𝑟 = ���𝑑𝑓 − 𝑑𝑡� 𝐷0,𝑡(1− α)�𝑑𝑓𝑑0�𝜀�𝑇𝑡=1  (8) 
 
Equation (8) is valid as long as variable pricing customers exactly pay the wholesale market 
price, thus, not affecting retailer profits. Below we define a slightly different version of the 
retailer profit function if the variable retail price and the wholesale price are not necessarily 
equal (as in the analysed rebate pricing schemes). 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the steps to take in determining short-term and long-term equilibria. As a 
reference we first establish an equilibrium without any variable retail rates largely resembling 
the situation of today (α = 0). We determine a set of generation capacities that results in a 
profit of zero for all generators. This is done by: 1) setting peak generator capacity to supply 
all of demand at zero profits, 2) substituting peak generator capacity with mid-merit capacity 
until both produce at zero profits, and 3) substituting mid-merit capacity with base-load 
generation until all generators, except for wind, produce at zero profits. We then find the flat 
retail rate that exactly covers wholesale market procurement cost of the retailer if 
consumption equals D0 (which will be the case at P0 = Pf). 
 
When customers switch to variable prices (α > 0), consumption and price in all of the hours 
changes according to the price elasticity of demand. To compensate for the retailer profits 
generated by a change in wholesale prices a new flat rate has to be determined.  A change in 
consumption also affects producer revenues. In order to fulfil the equilibrium condition of 
zero profits will therefore require adjusting capacities until we reach a new long-term 
equilibrium state with both generator and retailer profits at zero.  
2.3 Determining the economic benefits 
Overall economic benefits are determined as the net-change in consumer and producer 
surplus. Due to retail market competition retailer profits will be at zero. Producer surplus, 
defined by the difference between costs and revenues, will also be at zero in long-term 
equilibrium as revenues exactly cover fixed costs. This does not, however, apply to wind 
power producers; here we allow for the exception of non-zero profits. The relatively high 
investment cost of wind power would usually result in losses that we assume support 
payments to compensate for. We can then account for a change in support payments caused 
by the introduction of variable pricing in the overall net benefits.  
 
The change in consumer surplus, from a situation with all costumers on fixed prices to a new 
option with variable pricing, can be measured using the demand curve and the new set of 
prices. Figure 5 illustrates the change during one time step t as an area to the left of the 
marginal benefit curve in equation (4). As the marginal benefit curve is the inverse of the 
demand curve the area in Figure 5a corresponds to the area under the demand function shown 
in Figure 5b. We can thus take the integral of equation (3) over the price difference to 
determine the following expression for a change in consumer surplus per time step t:  
 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐷0,𝑡  P0 − Pt (PtP0)εε + 1 + (𝛼 − 1) 𝐷0,𝑡  P0 − Pf (PfP0)εε + 1  (9) 
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2.4 Modelling of rebate pricing schemes 
In modelling the load-shift rebate we want to reward only volumes shifted – payments for all 
other volumes stay the same as for flat rate customers. Although the rebate is not applied to 
the full volume, customers will have a marginal benefit on their consumption of the full 
rebate. Demand of rebate customers can thus be determined in line with equation (3) as: 
 
𝐷𝑣𝑏𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐷0,𝑡 �(1 + 𝑣) 𝑑𝑓𝑑0 �𝜀 (10) 
 
To settle such a product we need to establish a baseline in order to measure the load shift. The 
base-line consumption DBL,t is determined as the expected consumption of rebate customers at 
a rebate of zero: 
 
𝐷𝐵𝐵,𝑡 = 𝛼 𝐷0,𝑡 �𝑑𝑓𝑑0�𝜀 (11) 
 
The aim of the product is to react upon system conditions. Therefore the rebate will depend 
on the difference between the average flat rate price and the price during a predefined critical 
period. If during a particular rebate period Treb spot prices on average show a price difference 
to the flat rate, then the rebate gets triggered. A threshold value rthr may be added to avoid the 
provision of large rebates for relatively small deviations. During every single rebate period 
the rebate r is thus based on a predefined percentage rebate level rlevel and determined as: 
 
𝑣 = �𝑣𝑟𝑏𝑣𝑏𝑟 for  𝑑𝑡∈𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟 > (1 + 𝑣𝑡ℎ𝑣) 𝑑𝑓−𝑣𝑟𝑏𝑣𝑏𝑟 for  𝑑𝑡∈𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟 < (1 − 𝑣𝑡ℎ𝑣) 𝑑𝑓0 otherwise  (12) 
 
Depending on whether customers are expected to increase or reduce consumption in a given 
period the rebate r will now be either negative or positive. With the rebate determined by 
equation (12) during critical periods the electricity cost of a customer is calculated as: 
 
𝐶𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑡𝑏,𝑡 =  𝑑𝑓 �𝐷𝐵𝐵,𝑡 + (1 + 𝑣)�𝐷𝑣𝑏𝑏,𝑡 − 𝐷𝐵𝐵,𝑡�� (13) 
 
Equation (13) should result in savings only if Dreb,t deviates from DBL,t in the requested 
direction. Otherwise r should equal zero and costs will simply be based on the consumed 
volume times the flat rate Pf. This is important in contractual terms, but we do not add this 
condition here, because with demand determined by equations (10) and (11) this will always 
be the case due to the sign of the rebate. 
 
Dividing equation (13) with the consumption of rebate customers Dreb,t yields the average 
price a rebate customer pays for the full consumed volume during a rebate period – again 
provided the customer reacts as requested. The result may be simplified to: 
 
𝑑𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑡𝑏,𝑡 = 𝑑𝑓 �1 + 𝑣 − 𝑣 𝐷𝐵𝐵,𝑡𝐷𝑣𝑏𝑏,𝑡� (14) 
 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the changed marginal price level, which is the flat rate adjusted for 
the rebate, and the resulting relative average price (𝑑𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑣𝑡𝑏,𝑡/𝑑𝑓) during critical periods for a 
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rebate of 50%. While customers never pay more than the original flat rate, the marginal values 
under this scheme always create an incentive to shift demand in the required direction.   
 
A long-term equilibrium is not easily established for the rebate pricing scheme. As for other 
averaging variable pricing schemes, like for example time-of-use pricing, convergence is not 
guaranteed [50]. In our case, rebates should ideally be based on the actual price outcome, 
which in turn is affected by the behaviour of rebate customers. We avoid such feedback loops 
by setting rebates once for all based on prices in the reference case. Price changes in the 
variable pricing case are not allowed to further affect rebate levels.  
 
As for the hourly pricing cases we establish a retail market equilibrium by requiring zero 
retailer profits. The rebate customers do not pay the wholesale price, though, and thus affect 
retailer profits. We therefore need to adjust equation (8) accordingly: 
 
Π𝑣𝑏𝑡𝑣𝑤𝑟 = ���𝑑𝑓 − 𝑑𝑡� 𝐷0,𝑡(1− α)�𝑑𝑓𝑑0�𝜀 + �𝑑𝑣𝑔𝑟𝑣𝑡𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡� 𝐷𝑣𝑔𝑟,𝑡�𝑇𝑡=1  (15) 
3. CASE STUDY ASSUMPTIONS 
3.1 Demand side 
3.1.1 Consumption profiles 
A fundamental input to the model is the baseline demand D0. We use the aggregate Danish 
consumption profile of 2012, however, only of consumers not settled on an hourly basis [81]; 
that is, consumers with an annual consumption of less than 100 MWh. We focus on this 
particular group of customers, because we want to isolate the impact of a shift to variable 
pricing for customers without access to variable pricing schemes in the current regime. 
 
The price elasticity of demand is another crucial input. Although the exact elasticity will 
affect the overall absolute results, for our purpose it is most important that customers are price 
elastic at all. We therefore assume a fixed elasticity value and use -0.1 in line with various 
previous publications [18,76,82]. Table 1 summarises the main features of the demand 
assumptions. 
3.1.2 Retail pricing schemes 
We analyse four different retail pricing schemes. The first one is an hourly real-time pricing 
scheme reflecting wholesale market prices. The three remaining cases are variations of the 
rebate pricing scheme as described in section 2.4.  
 
The parameters of the rebate scheme should be kept simple from a customer point of view. 
Therefore customers will only be asked to shift volumes relative to a time window of three 
hours. The difference between the analysed cases lies in the time of day defined as rebate 
periods. In two of the cases periods are fixed, while the third case operates with a dynamic 
time window. As the response potential of household customers, in particular, is expected to 
be highest in the evening hours we analyse cases covering the early evening hours (16.00-
19.00) as well as later hours (20.00-23.00). In the following we refer to these products as 
“Rebate Evening” and “Rebate Night”. In the dynamic case (“Rebate Dynamic”) we 
determine the daily rebate period such that it covers the three-hour period with the largest 
price deviation, in any direction.  
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The input parameters for the rebate cases are summarised in Table 2. In all cases shifted 
volumes generate a rebate of 50% of the retail price. A signal to customers is triggered, 
whenever the average hourly price level within the defined time window differs from the flat 
rate price with more than 10%. This built-in threshold is to ensure that the response generates 
sufficient value at wholesale level.  
 
To not further complicate social benefit calculations all levies and taxes are left out of the 
picture. This is important to keep in mind, when interpreting the results. The consumers thus 
respond to prices as if taxed on an ad valorem basis instead of the usual unit tax. 
3.1.3 Adoption scenarios 
We calculate results for different adoption rates of variable pricing, and a reference case with 
all customers on a flat retail rate. For all of the different retail pricing cases, we calculate the 
effects of 20% of customers under the scheme and of all customers adopting the scheme. The 
20% scenario should reflect a realistically achievable potential, while the 100% is calculated 
as a reference showing the maximum potential under the different schemes. 
3.2 Supply side 
3.2.1 Generation 
We use fixed and variable costs for three stylised thermal generation technologies and wind 
power as shown in Table 3. Cost and technology data are based on the Technology Catalogue 
of the Danish Energy Agency [83]. All costs are adjusted for inflation to the price level of 
2016. Prices of fuels and CO2 are based on a simple average of forecasts over the lifetime of 
the respective technologies [84]. 
3.2.2 Wind power scenarios 
Two wind power scenarios are defined to determine the impact of an increase of variable 
production. The first scenario (“Base wind”) applies an hourly profile of the wind share in 
consumption in 2012. Using shares instead of the actual production values allows us to scale 
the wind profile to the share of consumption that we analyse. The annual share of wind power 
in consumption for this case is around 31%. In the second scenario (“High wind”) we increase 
the share to 50% of consumption. 
 
To estimate the costs of wind power we weight the assumptions in Table 3 to reflect the 
relative shares of onshore and offshore wind installations. In the base wind scenario we use a 
share of 25% offshore wind installations approximately reflecting current levels, while in the 
high wind scenario we assume an increase of offshore installations to 35% of installed wind 
power in line with scenarios by the Danish TSO [85]. The installed wind power capacity is 
determined based on the maximum annual wind production assuming that the production peak 
will lie at 92% of installed capacity.  
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Base wind scenario 
4.1.1 Hourly pricing 
Table 4 provides a summary of the results for the hourly retail pricing scheme under the base 
wind scenario showing the different cases horizontally and the results within several 
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categories vertically. We will present results in similarly structured tables for all cases 
throughout this section. 
 
The first vertical section of the Table 4 provides an overview of consumption and generation. 
For the consumption total annual volumes and the annual peak level is shown. On the supply 
side the installed capacities are shown together with the full load hours for each of the three 
dispatchable generation types: base load, mid-merit and peak load. Wind volumes are not 
shown as they are constant throughout all the cases within the same wind scenario.  
 
In all simulated cases total consumption increases as compared to the reference case. A part of 
the increase will again rebound towards the reference level in the long-term, however. The 
usual expectation is that the peak consumption decreases due to the customers’ response to 
high peak prices. This is the case for all but one of the simulations. Quite contrary to intuition, 
we do notice an increase in peak consumption in the short-term simulation results for 20% of 
customers on hourly pricing. This is due to a reduction of the flat rate in combination with the 
variable production profile of wind power (see also the discussion in Section 5). 
 
The generation capacities in the short-term simulations are kept at the reference case levels. In 
the long term they are adjusted by the model as expected, such that peak and mid-merit 
capacities are reduced, and base load capacity increased. These adjustments are due to the 
respective generator profits provided in the third vertical section of Table 4. In the short-term 
they become negative, because of the changes in wholesale prices caused by demand 
response. In particular, the peak prices are clearly reduced, but also the average is lower than 
in the reference case. The wholesale price is shown in the second vertical section of the results 
table. The capacity adjustments increase peak as well as average prices from their short-term 
levels, and generator profits return to zero. The long-term price peaks are lower than in the 
reference scenario, while the outcome for the average price level in both adoption scenarios is 
a slight increase.  
 
Besides wholesale prices the second vertical section of Table 4 also shows the cost of serving 
total load, reflecting the wholesale procurement cost of retailers, and the average prices paid 
by retail customer on either flat rate or variable rate. In all cases the cost of serving load is 
reduced compared to the reference. The described changes in wholesale market prices are 
reflected onto the flat retail rate that is reduced by more than 9 €/MWh as compared to the 
reference case in the short term. In the long run, however, the rate may as well increase. So 
while consumers immediately gain from responding to variable prices, not all customers will 
necessarily profit after generation capacity has been adjusted.  
 
The overall costs and benefits are presented in the lower sections of Table 4, where we show 
the change in consumer surplus for different customer groups in absolute terms and relative to 
total reference cost of serving load. Here we can observe that it is not even required for all of 
the consumers to switch to variable rates in order to find short-term gains of around 16%. The 
short-term result in the 100% adoption case is not much higher. The effect of capacity 
adjustments in the long run is evident in the results and reduces the change in consumer 
surplus to about 4.2% for 100% adoption and down to 1.18% for 20% adoption. 
 
We already mentioned thermal generator profits; besides those the total profit of wind 
generators is shown. The figures are negative due to high investment costs and reflect their 
need for support payments. The line showing total change in generator profits is the 
difference in profit compared to the reference case, which we consider as the relevant benefits 
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on the supply side. It is worth noting that for wind generators the change in profits is positive 
and their losses are reduced in all of the cases. The heightened value of wind power will result 
in reductions in the need for support payments and thus may also have a positive impact on 
consumers. 
 
Netting the effects in the lowest two lines of Table 4 provides us with the ideal economic 
gains of hourly pricing under given assumptions. These are 3.95% relative to total costs for 
serving load including the support to finance wind power in the reference case. With a more 
realistic adoption level of 20% the long-term results point at a relative annual improvement of 
1.12%.  
4.1.2 Rebate pricing schemes 
Results for the rebate pricing schemes are presented in Table 5 showing the different rebate 
schemes horizontally. We only present the final long-term equilibrium results here. The 
relation between short-term and long-term results is similar to the previous calculations of the 
hourly scheme. Note also, that we have not repeated the reference case results, so the 
presented numbers should be held up against the first column in Table 4.  
 
The rebate pricing scheme as defined for this analysis only covers a daily three-hour period. 
Therefore effects are limited as compared to the hourly pricing scheme. The most significant 
impact comes from a rebate during the early evening hours (Rebate “Evening”), because this 
is the time of the wholesale price peak in the reference case, given the used hourly data. 
Having a rebate during later hours (Rebate “Night”) is not very effective if using the same 
elasticity. The net effect of the “Night” rebate is only around 25% of the “Evening” rebate.  
 
A dynamic rebate turns out slightly better. But although this scheme catches the highest daily 
differences between flat rate and hourly prices, it could not improve on the result of the 
evening rebate. The major reason for the weak performance of the dynamic rebate is that the 
level of the flat rate lies above the simple average of wholesale prices, and thus the difference 
to peak prices is usually less than the difference to base prices, resulting in rebates to increase 
consumption during off-peak hours on many days. Only during very high price spikes will the 
dynamic rebate be triggered at peak times. At off-peak times, however, the rebate is often not 
sufficient to affect prices, and this is also a reason for the negative impact on wind power 
profits under the dynamic scheme. 
 
Similar to the hourly scheme two of the rebates may result in an increase in total 
consumption. But while the hourly scheme reduces total cost of serving load in spite of 
increased consumption, this is not the case for all of the rebate simulations. On the other hand 
the rebate products are able to consistently increase the consumer surplus and the net effects 
including the change in generator profits are positive as well. Just as in the hourly case, we 
also note that passive flat rate customers in the 20% scenario may be affected negatively. 
However, this only happens in the “Night” rebate case which has a very limited impact 
anyway. 
4.2 High wind scenario 
4.2.1 Hourly pricing 
Results for hourly pricing under the high wind scenario are summarised in Table 6. At first it 
is important to note the difference in the results of the reference case with 100% flat rate 
pricing as compared to the base wind scenario. In the reference case of the high wind scenario 
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total costs of supply are reduced by around 40 million EUR. At the same time the net support 
to wind power is increased by 160 million EUR, mostly because we require higher capacities 
to be installed and a larger share of them will be offshore and thus more expensive. Moreover, 
base load capacity is lower compared to the base wind scenario, while required peak capacity 
rises. Full load hours are decreased for all dispatchable generation technologies, most 
significantly, though, for the base load capacity. We can also observe higher price peaks than 
in the base wind scenario. Consumption on the other hand is at a similar level for all cases in 
both wind scenarios, with a less pronounced increase under hourly pricing in the high wind 
scenario. 
 
Again we see the expected relation between short-term and long-term effects. A more 
surprising result is the extent of the negative impact on passive flat rate customers in the 20% 
adoption case in the long run. While in the short term all customers gain as expected, the flat 
rate is required to rise significantly above the reference level in the long-term in order for the 
retailers to break even. The result in this case is that the 80% flat rate customers loose three 
times as much as the 20% variable pricing customers gain.  
 
The net effect is still positive for all of the cases. In absolute terms the net effect is higher than 
in the lower wind scenario, while relative to the reference cost the gains are slightly lower. 
This is because, even in the case affecting flat rate customers the worst, the effect on revenues 
of wind power producers is positive. Their increased income on the wholesale market more 
than compensates for the losses of flat rate consumers. If these gains are evenly distributed 
amongst customers then the 80% flat rate consumers will be compensated, because 80% of 
the gains for wind producers exceed the reductions in the 20% adoption case. 
 
Overall we observe the net effect to be similar to the base wind scenario. But while in the 
base wind scenario gains primarily come from an increase in consumer surplus, they will to a 
larger extent result from the increase in the value of wind power in the high wind case. 
4.2.2 Rebate pricing schemes 
Table 7 provides an overview of the simulation results for the rebate pricing schemes. A 
striking result is that for all of the partial adoption cases the consumer surplus gains of rebate 
customers are insufficient to compensate for losses of remaining customers due to a rise in the 
flat rate. In order to maintain the same flat rate across all customers, pure flat rate customers 
will contribute to compensate a reduction in revenues to the retailer caused by rebates. This 
will not necessarily be the case in practice, where rebate customers may have to compensate 
for inefficient response on their own. 
 
The short-term results, not shown in the table, are very positive in all the rebate cases. In the 
long-term, though, one might see an increase in prices and thus cost as compared to the 
reference level. Although we are observing these effects in the high wind scenario, the rebate 
schemes still provide a positive contribution to wind power producers. Therefore the overall 
net results in all of the cases stay positive. 
 
The 100% cases for the “Night” and the “Dynamic” rebate schemes show that a poorly 
designed scheme would result in long-term losses for the participants. As compared to the 
base wind scenario, however, the dynamic rebate has a much more positive effect on the value 
of wind power. In the reference case for the high wind scenario, wind is the marginal 
technology in more than 1000 hours of the year as compared to 40 hours in the base wind 
case. The dynamic rebate reduces the number of hours by 365 in the high wind scenario, 
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which is much more than what could be achieved in the base wind case. This stresses the 
importance of dynamic instruments in a setting with high wind production. 
5. DISCUSSION 
The results of our case study illustrate some general effects of variable pricing in line with 
findings in other studies on real-time pricing. As we used the case of Denmark applying two 
scenarios of wind power production, we are able to observe some additional effects specific to 
systems with high shares of fluctuating, non-dispatchable generation. We also used alternative 
rebate pricing schemes to investigate whether the economic effects under such schemes may 
justify their implementation, assuming they could reach higher levels of adoption and 
response than hourly pricing. 
 
Some generally expected effects of variable pricing can be observed in our simulation results. 
Maximum price peaks are significantly reduced under hourly pricing. In the short term 
reduction will be quite strong, while in the long-term prices return to a higher level due to 
adjustments in generation capacity. Another observation confirming previous findings [86] is 
that low adoption rates, with hourly pricing in particular, are sufficient to generate very 
attractive results from a consumer point of view in the short term, while increasing adoption 
does not change results significantly. In the long term, however, we find adoption to be more 
important in generating economic benefits, underlining the importance of analysing these 
effects.  
 
The impact of wind power is reflected in some effects we found to be different from results in 
other studies. Usually peak consumption would be decreased with variable pricing, however, 
the irregular pattern of wind production allows for increasing peak consumption without 
increasing costs in some of the analysed cases as well. The reason for that is a significant 
decrease in the flat retail rate with flat rate customers increasing their consumption in 
response. This is only possible, because due to the wind production during the consumption 
peak, this is not the hour determining demand for dispatchable capacity. 
 
Variable pricing will on average lead to price reductions in the short term that affect other 
customers on fixed rates positively as well. In the long run this is not necessarily the case and 
the immediate cost of flat rate customers may even rise in specific cases. It has been stated in 
previous analyses that a switch of customers to real-time pricing makes all customers better 
off [49]. The intuitive explanation of such a result is that the efficient retail rate is equal to the 
volume-weighted average wholesale prices. Customers on variable pricing schemes reduce 
peak prices, at times when demand is usually high. In contrast, our results show that in a 
system with high shares of variable production it is possible to observe an increase in the flat 
rate. While demand response customers still reduce price peaks, these peaks, because they 
also depend on the wind power production, must not in any case coincide with the highest 
consumption of flat-rate customers. Therefore, depending on the profiles of wind and 
consumption, retailer costs to supply flat-rate customers are not necessarily reduced as it 
should be expected without the effect of wind. This effect seems to become more pronounced 
with larger shares of wind power in the system. 
 
Besides the impacts on consumers we note direct implications for wind producers. The value 
of wind production increases in all but one of the rebate cases under the base wind scenario. 
For the high wind scenario we find a consistent positive effect in all of the pricing schemes. 
This effect reduces the requirement for support payments to wind producers. On the other 
hand the positive effect of variable pricing on consumer surplus is reduced in the high wind 
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scenario due to increasing prices for flat rate customers. The gains from savings in the support 
should therefore be returned to the consumers via lower electricity bills or taxes.  
 
The analyses of the rebate schemes have shown that simple rebate structures are necessarily 
less effective from an economic point of view than customers responding directly to 
wholesale price signals. Under rebate pricing the long-term peak prices are almost at the same 
level as in the reference case. Only in the short term significant peak price reductions can be 
attained under such schemes. If we compare the effect of the rebates to the ideal schemes we 
see that we can still achieve up to about 18% of the hourly pricing long-term effect with a 
much simpler rebate scheme as well. It should be kept in mind that this level is achieved by 
only sending a simple signal regarding three consecutive hours to the customers per day. The 
signal will only contain the information of whether increased or reduced consumption will 
generate savings, and the benefit to the consumers will always be the same. This is much to 
the contrary of conditions under a real-time pricing scheme. Moreover, in the short-term the 
relative effect of a rebate can be shown to be up to around 50% of gains under real-time 
pricing.  
 
In the rebate pricing schemes the timing of rebate periods is critical. A problem of fixed 
rebate periods, as applied in two of the cases, will be that in the long-term price peaks are 
likely to occur at times outside of the rebate time window. The integration of higher shares of 
wind will require more dynamic schemes [87]. Accordingly we find the dynamic rebate to 
have the most positive impact on wind power revenues in the high wind scenario. The design 
of the applied rebate structure, however, could certainly be improved. Due to simplification in 
the modelling of the dynamic rebate scheme in particular, it does not improve results as much 
as it should be expected.  
 
The model presented and applied above provides indications of how demand response affects 
consumer and producer surplus in a system with high shares of wind power. To keep the 
model versatile and enable testing of different pricing structures we limited its complexity and 
left out a couple of conditions. In the following we briefly discuss how these may affect 
results. 
 
The most substantial concern may be that we look at a closed economy and do not allow for 
other sources of flexibility to react upon prices. This would clearly reduce the economic 
benefit of these kinds of pricing schemes, because the flat-rate benchmark will not have such 
extreme price spikes as we see them in the model. It could still be argued that for political 
reasons, from a national perspective, production capacities should be held available for 
security reasons, even though peak demand is covered by interconnection capacities with 
neighbouring countries. This approach has been used previously [71,72,88] and ensures that 
isolated system operation will be possible. The capacity will then be idle at peak times and 
would not gain scarcity rents as in the model. They would still have to be financed, though, so 
consumers would have to cover this cost. In that case however, demand response could not 
directly contribute to avoiding the costs, as payments for such capacity most likely will be 
independent of the timing of consumption. 
 
The model uses a simplified representation of production capacities, only incorporating the 
major categories of plants. Using a more detailed model of plants may provide more accurate 
numerical results. The general conclusions, however, would stay the same. In practice 
generators would have more technical restrictions limiting their flexibility. In Denmark, for 
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example, combined heat and power production is an important factor. Such restrictions of 
plant flexibility could be expected to add to the value of demand response. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Using a partial equilibrium model of the electricity market we were able to derive a couple of 
new insights regarding the economic benefits of different retail pricing schemes for household 
customers. Applying case study data for Denmark we were able to analyse the interplay of 
demand response with different levels of wind power. Our results indicate favourable 
strategies in such a setting to ensure high adoption and efficient response to load shifting 
incentives for households. 
 
Simple pricing schemes could become important in an early phase to initialise the 
development of household demand response. Our results confirm that variable pricing, 
whether in the form of real-time pricing or less complex structures, will have an overall 
positive economic impact. As expected, real-time pricing is clearly superior to the analysed 
rebate pricing schemes in a long-term equilibrium producing significant benefits of around 
4% of total costs. Although the effects of the rebate structures may be limited in the long 
term, it can also be observed that the simple schemes could provide quite sizable gains in a 
short-term equilibrium. This result suggests that it could be recommendable to implement 
simplified pricing schemes in building up a base of demand response to begin with.  
 
At a later point in time when the long-term dynamics begin to take effect, a larger effort 
should be made to shift consumers onto real-time rates. As households would have gathered 
experience with variable pricing schemes, the barriers to adoption should be expected to be 
lower. Moreover, automation equipment should be more widely available enabling a more 
active response. Such an approach would also accommodate the point that with higher shares 
of variable production, more dynamic schemes are preferable. 
 
Benefits are not evenly distributed among customers on different rates. With increasing shares 
of variable production passive customers may even become negatively affected. While 
initially this should be evaluated as a welfare reduction, it could also increase the incentive for 
such customers to switch to variable rates and become more responsive. 
 
Demand response under variable pricing can also be found to make wind power more 
valuable. The resulting reduction in the need for support should be returned to consumers in a 
way that preserves incentives for demand response, and could maybe even reward flexible 
customers specifically. Such compensations could become recommendable due to the 
diminishing long-term benefits for responsive customers; but also because customer gains 
may be far lower in the high wind settings, even though in absolute terms total economic 
benefits from demand response increase with more wind. 
 
Our findings also suggest that an increased focus on adoption rates will be required in the 
long term. While harvesting the short-term gains could become an incentive for first-movers, 
the decrease in benefits over time could have an adverse effect and result in customers 
moving back to flat rates. As flexibility will be required even more in the long run this 
situation should be avoided. The more exact timing of long-term over short-term effects is an 
important aspect that requires further research. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
Dt: Demand in hour t 
D0,t: Baseline demand in hour t 
Pt: Price in hour t 
P0: Anchor price 
ε: Price elasticity 
α: Share of consumers on variable prices 
Pf: Flat-rate price 
MBt: Marginal benefit of consumption in hour t 
MCt: Marginal cost of supply in hour t 
Q: Quantity supplied 
Qwind,t: Quantity supplied by wind in hour t 
Kbase/mid/peak: Installed capacities of respective technology 
cvar,base/mid/peak: Variable costs of respective technology 
cmargin,t: Variable costs of the marginal technology in hour t 
Qsum,infra,t: Sum of inframarginal production incl. wind in hour t 
cvar,extra: Variable costs of next extramarginal technology 
k: Emergency slope 
Πgen: Generator profit 
Qgen,t: Quantity supplied by generation technology in hour t 
Kgen: Installed capacity of generation technology 
cvar,gen: Variable cost of generation technology 
cfix,gen: Fixed cost of generation technology 
Πretail: Retailer profit 
∆CSt: Change in consumer surplus 
Dreb,t: Demand of rebate customers in hour t 
DBL,t: Rebate customer baseline demand in hour t 
r: Rebate 
rlevel: Rebate level in percent 
rthr: Rebate threshold in percent 
Treb: Set of hours subject to rebate 
Crebate,t: Cost of rebate customers in hour t 
Prebate,t: Effective price of rebate customers in hour t 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Complexity and economic potential of different pricing schemes 
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Figure 2: Aggregate demand curve for different shares of variable price customers 
 
 
Figure 3: Stylised supply curves with and without wind production 
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Figure 4: Algorithm to determine short and long-term equilibria 
 
 
  
(a)  (b) 
Figure 5: Change in consumer surplus to the left of the marginal benefit curve (a) and equivalent area 
under the demand curve (b) 
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Figure 6: Rebate for reduced consumption 
 
 
Figure 7: Rebate for increased consumption 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Main features of demand input data 
  
Demand input 
Total consumption GWh 15,729.4 
Max. consumption MW 3700.8 
Min. consumption MW 824.6 
Elasticity - -0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2: Input data for rebate pricing cases 
   
Rebate  
Evening Night Dynamic 
Rebate % of flat rate 50% 50% 50% 
Rebate period Hours of day 17-19 21-23 3 hours with largest ∆ 
Rebate threshold % of flat rate 10% 10% 10% 
 
 
 
Table 3: Input costs of stylised generation technologies 
   
Base Mid Peak Wind 
(onshore) 
Wind 
(offshore) 
Fixed costs 
      
 
Specific investment M EUR/MW 2.19 0.93 0.70 1.29 3.61 
 
Lifetime years 40 25 25 20 25 
 
Discount rate % 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
 
Equivalent annual cost EUR/MW 110,764 59,849 44,715 94,891 231,140 
 
Fixed O&M cost EUR/MW 61,471 32,240 0 0 0 
 
Total fixed costs EUR/MW 172,235 92,089 44,715 94,891 231,140 
Variable costs 
      
 
Plant efficiency % 46.0% 56.5% 39.5% - - 
 
Fuel - Coal Gas Gas - - 
 
Emission ton/GJ-fuel 0.094 0.056 0.056 - - 
 
Fuel price EUR/GJ-fuel 3.05 7.14 7.14 - - 
 
CO2 price EUR/t-CO2 14.47 12.97 12.97 - - 
 
Fuel cost EUR/MWh 23.90 45.48 65.06 0.00 0.00 
 
CO2 cost EUR/MWh 2.96 1.29 1.84 0.00 0.00 
 
Variable O&M cost EUR/MWh 2.15 2.69 3.44 10.75 20.42 
 
Total variable cost EUR/MWh 29.00 49.46 70.34 10.75 20.42 
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Table 4: Simulation results for hourly pricing schemes in base wind scenario 
Case   Reference Hourly pricing 
Adoption rate % 0% 20% 100% 
Equilibrium   long-term short-term long-term short-term long-term 
Consumption 
     Total GWh/y 15,729 16,033 15,815 16,134 16,106 
Max MW 3,701 3,737 3,658 3,622 3,613 
Generation capacities 
     Base MW 1,302 1,302 1,316 1,302 1,372 
Mid MW 284 284 268 284 205 
Peak MW 1,864 1,864 1,572 1,864 856 
Full load hours 
     Base h/y 7,045 7,200 7,091 7,406 7,256 
Mid h/y 3,116 3,294 3,114 3,262 3,093 
Peak h/y 488 516 565 430 882 
Wholesale price 
     Avg. €/MWh 48.54 44.39 48.61 44.36 48.61 
Max. €/MWh 44,785.07 117.64 12,328.52 70.34 1,749.17 
Cost of serving load 
     Total T€/y 891,570 761,060 882,073 756,461 857,867 
Specific €/MWh 56.68 47.47 55.77 46.89 53.26 
Average retail rate 
     Flat rate €/MWh 56.68 47.61 56.73 - - 
Variable €/MWh - 46.89 52.06 46.89 53.26 
Consumer surplus change 
     Flat rate T€/y 0 115,096 -571 0 0 
Variable rate T€/y 0 29,915 11,123 150,121 37,447 
Total T€/y 0 145,011 10,552 150,121 37,447 
Relative* % 0% 16.26% 1.18% 16.84% 4.20% 
Generator profits 
     Thermal T€/y 0 -143,304 0 -144,988 0 
Wind T€/y -236,276 -235,494 -234,239 -234,556 -229,135 
Total change T€/y 0 -142,522 2,037 -143,268 7,141 
Net effect 
     Total T€/y 0 2,489 12,589 6,853 44,588 
Relative**  % 0% 0.22% 1.12% 0.61% 3.95% 
 *  Relative to total reference cost of serving load 
** Relative to total reference cost of serving load and wind support 
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Table 5: Simulation results for rebate pricing schemes in base wind scenario 
Case   Rebate "Evening" Rebate "Night" Rebate "Dynamic" 
Adoption rate % 20% 100% 20% 100% 20% 100% 
Equilibrium   long-term long-term long-term long-term long-term long-term 
Consumption 
      Total GWh/y 15,728 15,726 15,745 15,804 15,749 15,819 
Max MW 3,671 3,709 3,701 3,700 3,701 3,701 
Generation capacities 
      Base MW 1,305 1,317 1,306 1,321 1,305 1,309 
Mid MW 282 273 283 275 282 276 
Peak MW 1,836 1,721 1,862 1,853 1,858 1,858 
Full load hours 
      Base h/y 7,045 7,035 7,047 7,045 7,054 7,096 
Mid h/y 3,121 3,128 3,118 3,118 3,111 3,109 
Peak h/y 488 492 484 473 489 488 
Wholesale price 
      Avg. €/MWh 48.60 48.61 48.54 48.54 48.61 48.61 
Max. €/MWh 44,784.86 44,784.80 44,784.92 44,784.86 44,784.84 44,784.67 
Cost of serving load 
      Total T€/y 890,706 885,791 892,022 894,177 890,658 892,423 
Specific €/MWh 56.63 56.33 56.66 56.58 56.55 56.41 
Average retail rate 
      Flat rate €/MWh 56.68 56.56 56.70 56.80 56.59 56.58 
Variable €/MWh 56.45 56.33 56.48 56.58 56.42 56.41 
Consumer surplus change 
      Flat rate T€/y 0 0 -244 0 1,211 0 
Variable rate T€/y 712 5,537 618 1,496 802 4,051 
Total T€/y 712 5,537 374 1,496 2,013 4,051 
Relative* % 0.08% 0.62% 0.04% 0.17% 0.23% 0.45% 
Generator profits 
      Thermal T€/y 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wind T€/y -235,401 -233,818 -236,242 -235,936 -237,513 -237,708 
Total change T€/y 875 2,458 34 340 -1,237 -1,432 
Net effect 
      Total T€/y 1,587 7,995 408 1,836 775 2,619 
Relative**  % 0.14% 0.71% 0.04% 0.16% 0.07% 0.23% 
*  Relative to total reference cost of serving load 
** Relative to total reference cost of serving load and wind support 
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Table 6: Simulation results for hourly pricing schemes in high wind scenario 
Case   Reference Hourly pricing 
Adoption rate % 0% 20% 100% 
Equilibrium   long-term short-term long-term short-term long-term 
Consumption 
     Total GWh/y 15,729 16,001 15,770 16,110 16,069 
Max MW 3,701 3,727 3,646 3,682 3,682 
Generation capacities 
     Base MW 1,029 1,029 1,036 1,029 1,086 
Mid MW 385 385 369 385 309 
Peak MW 2,007 2,007 1,690 2,007 909 
Full load hours 
     Base h/y 6,050 6,238 6,113 6,514 6,394 
Mid h/y 3,097 3,204 3,094 3,165 3,082 
Peak h/y 460 478 534 398 857 
Wholesale price 
     Avg. €/MWh 46.88 44.06 48.61 43.90 48.61 
Max. €/MWh 44,785.07 102.65 23,692.33 70.34 2,589.32 
Cost of serving load 
     Total T€/y 850,818 739,813 863,535 733,354 838,582 
Specific €/MWh 54.09 46.24 54.76 45.52 52.19 
Average retail rate 
     Flat rate €/MWh 54.09 46.38 55.78 - - 
Variable €/MWh - 45.66 50.81 45.52 52.19 
Consumer surplus change 
     Flat rate T€/y 0 97,761 -21,158 0 0 
Variable rate T€/y 0 25,577 7,028 130,515 13,596 
Total T€/y 0 123,339 -14,130 130,515 13,596 
Relative* % 0% 14.50% -1.66% 15.34% 1.60% 
Generator profits 
     Thermal T€/y 0 -147,308 0 -150,238 0 
Wind T€/y -398,437 -372,343 -370,650 -372,172 -363,524 
Total change T€/y 0 -121,214 27,787 -123,974 34,913 
Net effect 
     Total T€/y 0 2,124 13,656 6,542 48,509 
Relative**  % 0% 0.17% 1.09% 0.52% 3.88% 
*  Relative to total reference cost of serving load 
** Relative to total reference cost of serving load and wind support 
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Table 7: Simulation results for rebate pricing schemes in high wind scenario 
Case   Rebate "Evening" Rebate "Night" Rebate "Dynamic" 
Adoption rate % 20% 100% 20% 100% 20% 100% 
Equilibrium   long-term long-term long-term long-term long-term long-term 
Consumption 
      Total GWh/y 15,729 15,741 15,734 15,777 15,728 15,799 
Max MW 3,671 3,782 3,699 3,699 3,696 3,696 
Generation capacities 
      Base MW 1,030 1,039 1,031 1,039 1,028 1,036 
Mid MW 382 371 382 371 383 373 
Peak MW 1,981 1,872 2,006 2,008 1,984 1,986 
Full load hours 
      Base h/y 6,057 6,081 6,056 6,088 6,062 6,115 
Mid h/y 3,100 3,104 3,095 3,104 3,097 3,090 
Peak h/y 462 471 457 451 465 464 
Wholesale price 
      Avg. €/MWh 47.00 47.00 47.09 47.09 47.50 47.50 
Max. €/MWh 44,784.89 44,785.04 44,784.83 44,784.89 44,784.85 44,784.80 
Cost of serving load 
      Total T€/y 851,736 846,711 854,366 855,504 860,503 862,217 
Specific €/MWh 54.15 53.79 54.30 54.23 54.71 54.58 
Average retail rate 
      Flat rate €/MWh 54.19 54.09 54.34 54.42 54.75 54.75 
Variable €/MWh 53.98 53.88 54.15 54.23 54.57 54.58 
Consumer surplus change 
      Flat rate T€/y -1,292 0 -3,137 0 -8,237 0 
Variable rate T€/y 329 3,254 -210 -2,227 -1,542 -7,761 
Total T€/y -963 3,254 -3,347 -2,227 -9,780 -7,761 
rel. % -0.11% 0.38% -0.39% -0.26% -1.15% -0.91% 
Generator profits 
      Thermal T€/y 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wind T€/y -395,782 -394,794 -394,676 -394,246 -387,201 -387,397 
Total change T€/y 2,655 3,644 3,761 4,191 11,237 11,040 
Net effect 
      Total T€/y 1,692 6,898 414 1,965 1,457 3,279 
rel. % 0.14% 0.55% 0.03% 0.16% 0.12% 0.26% 
*  Relative to total reference cost of serving load 
** Relative to total reference cost of serving load and wind support 
 
